CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS: STUDY OF CHINESE FIRMS by Siheng Chen & Shuai Liu
  
 
 
 
CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS: STUDY OF CHINESE FIRMS  
 
by 
 
Siheng Chen 
Bachelor of Arts and Social Science, Simon Fraser University, 2012 
 
and 
 
Shuai Liu 
Bachelor of Arts, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, 2012 
 
 
PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN FINANCE 
 
 
In the Master of Science in Finance Program  
of the  
Faculty 
of 
Business Administration 
 
 
© Si Heng Chen 2013 
© Shuai Liu 2013 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
Summer 2013 
 
 
All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work 
may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for Fair Dealing. 
Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, 
particularly if cited appropriately. 
 ii 
 
Approval 
Name: Insert your name here 
Degree: Master of Science in Finance 
Title of Project: Insert your title here. Title page must be the same as this. 
Supervisory Committee: 
  
 Christina Atanasova 
Senior Supervisor 
Correct Title – (i.e. Associate Professor) 
  ___________________________________________ 
 Evan Gatev 
Second Reader 
Correct Title  
Date Approved:  Aug 9,2013 
 
Note (Don’t forget to delete this note before printing): The Approval page must be only one page 
long.  This is because it MUST be page “ii”, while the Abstract page MUST begin on page “iii”. Finally, 
don’t delete this page from your electronic document, if your department’s grad assistant is producing 
the “real” approval page for signature.  You need to keep the page in your document, so that the 
“Approval” heading continues to appear in the Table of Contents.  
 iii 
 
Abstract 
This study focuses on the determinants of cash holdings in the period of 2003-
2012 for Chinese manufacturing industry and how Chinese firms manage cash holdings. 
In general, when firms are more financially constrained, they are more likely to hold 
more cash. According to our investigation, firms with lower leverage, less net working 
capital (NWC), and lower capital expenditures, are more likely to increase cash holdings.  
In addition, China has different economic environment from developed countries, most of 
manufacturing firms are state owned; thus, the government policies influence the 
motivations of firms. 
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we document a trend of significant increase in cash holdings of 
Chinese firms for the period 2003-2012. The amount of cash held is one of the indicators 
of firm’s operation and risk management. Sufficient cash holdings mean financial 
flexibility and liquidity for a firm. There is an optimal amount of cash that firms can hold 
in an account. Firstly, cash is a buffer for future uncertainty. Most firms hold cash due to 
precautionary motives. It is also an investment signal for creditors and investor because 
they prefer stable firms with positive cash flows. From investment point of view cheaper 
source of funding when there are financial constraints on raising external finance. Cash 
also guarantees firm’s ability of pay back its debt.  At the same time, holding excessive 
amounts of cash is costly. Free cash may create agency problems for the firm. Too much 
cash may result in the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers where 
managers use cash to pursue private benefits that do not maximize shareholders’ wealth, 
e.g. an empire building. Second, large amount of cash holding could lead to lower level 
of inventory thus lower operational sales revenue. Also there is an opportunity cost to 
holding non-interest bearing assets on the balance sheet. 
This paper examines the determinants of corporate cash holding for the Chinese 
manufacturing industry from 2003 to 2012.  Bates et al (2009) document an increase in 
cash holding for firms in the US and examine their determinants. The existing literature, 
however, lags in studies of the determinants of cash holdings for developing countries 
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such as China. This study intends to cover the lag in the literature and to provide insights 
to the relationship between cash holding and the type of ownership. 
The result shows the larger the firm is, the more cash they will hold. This can be 
explained that large firms are seeking expansion and thus they hold cash for their 
research and development. In addition, net working capital (NWC) demonstrates obvious 
inverse relationship with cash ratio. Furthermore, firms with lower leverage and less 
NWC are more likely to attain more cash. The influence of industry sigma (Tobin’S Q) is 
not observable for Chinese firms. The correlation between Tobin’s Q and cash ratio does 
not follow the result of the literatures. These results propose that Chinese firms hold cash 
for precautionary motives. 
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2. Literature Review 
    Since the 1990s, China began to transition toward a market-oriented financial 
strategy; the Chinese market has become increasing important worldwide (Mookerjee and 
Yu 1995; Salvatore 2010). This paper is focused on how Chinese firms manage cash 
holdings and it aims to demonstrate the dominant influence of government on cash 
holdings.  
  In a world of perfect capital markets, holdings of liquid assets are irrelevant. If 
cash flow turns out to be unexpectedly low, such that a firm has to raise funds to keep 
operating and to invest, it can do so at zero cost. Since there is no liquidity premium in 
such a world, holdings of liquid assets have no opportunity cost. Hence, if a firm borrows 
money and invests it in liquid assets, shareholder wealth is unchanged.  
Once we relax the assumption of perfect markets, holding cash in the account means 
liquidity for a company and ability of this company to pay back debt. Investors and 
lenders consider positive cash holding as a stable operation sign for a corporate company. 
On the other hand, holding cash in a bank account may become a conservative 
management sign for investors because company will miss investment opportunities 
instead of receiving interest from bank. Because of the time value of money, company 
will suffer lower financial return of liquid assets. Through analyses of the current 
literature and economic conditions in China, the determinants factors of cash holding can 
be classified as the followings briefly.  
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Agency problem is one of the motives for firms to hold cash. The interests of 
management are at the odds with that of shareholders. Too much cash might make 
management lax and encourage imprudent acquisition and expansion (Jensen, 1986). In 
general, management does not want to have the pressure of consistent payout on 
dividend. From the view of shareholders perspective, they do not like share buybacks 
because it means they are losing the ownership of the company. Poor shareholder 
protection cannot force managers to disgorge excessive cash balances. None of the 
evidence points to manager holding more cash simply because it is more difficult to 
access capital markets in countries with poor shareholder protection (Dittmar et al. 2003). 
Chinese stock market is influenced by government policy, thus the dividends payout is an 
issue to managers. Indeed, the agency costs are quite high in China (Feng and Johansson, 
2011).  
Transaction motive is another factor that influences firm’s cash holding. Lower 
transaction cost is one of the main benefits from holding liquid assets. Firms save 
transaction costs to raise funds and does not have to liquidate assets to make payments. 
According to the Baumol (1952), transactions demand for cash will vary approximately 
in proportion with the money value of transactions. The demand for cash rises less than in 
proportion with the volume of transactions, so that there are, in effect, economies of scale 
from using cash. In order to avoid transaction cost, company use economies of scale to 
stock cash (Bates et al. 2009).  
As most companies use cash as a rick management tool, they may have 
precautionary motives to hold cash. Cash provides buffer for uncertainty and against 
adverse cash flow shocks (Bates et al. 2009; Hugonnier et al. 2011). Almeida et al. 
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(2004) demonstrate theoretically that the cash flow sensitivity of cash, the systematic 
propensity to save cash out of cash flows, is positive in financially constrained firms. 
Developing countries have the similar conditions. Lian et al. (2011) find that Chinese 
firms hold relatively more cash for precautionary purpose due to the severe financial 
constraints as a result of imperfect capital market in China. The existence of influential 
insiders and controlling investors has made the situation worse (Feng and Johansson, 
2011). 
Research proposes that corporate cash holdings are mainly determined by 
business environments (operational determinants), by governance arrangements and 
agency conflicts. In the absence of agency conflicts, firms (in the neoclassical sense, 
where each firm operates as a single economic agent) will choose their cash holdings to 
maximize firm values given their underlying business environments. With regard to 
operational determinants, research indicates that firms that use more cash for payments 
and incur higher transactions costs from converting noncash financial assets to cash will 
hold more cash, to facilitate transacting (Baumol 1952; Miller and Orr 1966). Similarly, 
firms with relatively greater investment opportunities or those who face more costly or 
more constrained access to capital markets will also hold more cash, again, for 
operational reasons. These factors have been examined by, for example, Opler et al. 
(1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), and Duchin (2010).  
On the basis of our review of the literature, we propose the following three 
hypothesises:  
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Hypothesis 1: Cash holdings are positively related to firm’s investment 
opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q. Net working capital and capital expenses are 
negatively related to cash holdings as well.  
Hypothesis 2: Chinese firms hold more cash during the crisis than in normal 
times.  
Cash holdings are associated with firms’ financial constraints status. Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) show that the marginal value of cash holdings is greater for financially 
constrained firms. Almeida et al. (2004) show that firms save cash out of current cash 
flow when they are financially constrained or are concerned about possible 
underinvestment in the future. Moreover, Almeida er al. (2004) built model using 
numbers of manufacturing firms to estimate the cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
Manufacturing is one of the largest industries in China, this model could be implies to 
China’s corporate after testing. 
Hypothesis 3: Chinese firms differ from enterprises in developed countries in that 
the national government has a dominant influence over them. The higher the level of 
government ownership in Chinese firms, the lower the firm value since the government 
will try to extract private benefits of control based on its relatively large ownership of 
firms. The higher the degree of government ownership in Chinese firms, the higher the 
likelihood of holding relatively higher levels of cash.  
According to LaPorta et al. (1999), firms controlled by large shareholders can 
encounter agency problems which pit the controlling shareholder against other minority 
shareholders. The controlling shareholder attempts to maximize his welfare by 
influencing the decision of management. When the controlling shareholder’s interests are 
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perfectly aligned with the interests of outside investors, then the outside investors benefit 
when the controlling shareholder takes actions which maximizes his welfare. However, 
when the interests of the controlling shareholder and outside investors are not perfectly 
aligned, then agency problems arise causing the controlling shareholder to maximize his 
welfare while at the same time harming the interests of outside investors. The benefits 
that the controlling shareholder extracts at the expense of other investors are referred to 
as the private benefits of control. The level of such benefits is in large part dependent on 
how well the interests of outside minority investors are protected in the firm’s country. It 
should be noted that as a controlling shareholder obtains more private benefits, the 
outside investors’ assessment of firm value falls.  
In China, the government is the controlling shareholder in a large number of 
Chinese firms. There are over 2 million private enterprises in China, and 500,000 state-
owned and collective enterprises. State-owned enterprises are firms with over 50 percent 
state ownership. Conflicts often arise between firms and politicians because the 
government wields control through its partial ownership of commercialized enterprises 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994). According to Shleifer and Vishny, state-assigned managers 
may act in the interest of the politicians who control them rather than the interests of the 
firms.  
As discussed, Almeida et al. (2004) argue that the cash flow sensitivity of cash, 
the systematic propensity to save cash out of cash flows, is positive for financially 
constrained firms. This phenomenon is stronger in a recession. Accordingly, we replace 
the level of cash holdings by the changes in cash and test the above three hypotheses 
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regarding the determinants to cash holdings in China. The next section discusses the data 
used in this study and our research methodology. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data description 
For the purpose of this study, we extract data from 1406 public firms’ financial 
reports from ORBIS, and then define nine variables to explore the relationships between 
cash holding and other financial variables such as leverage, R & D, etc. We use average 
cash to assets ratio to measure cash holding variable. The finding is similar to US firms’, 
which indicates Chinese firms are increasing their cash holding as well. There are a few 
variables are particular important. First, the net working capital, the noncash components 
of working capital can be converted into cash quickly. Secondly, cash flow are positively 
related to risk, the increase in risk has a substantial impact on cash holdings. That’s why, 
during the financial crisis, firms tend to hold more cash. The last one is the capital 
expenditure which has a negative correlation with cash holdings. 
In 2006, China issued The New Accounting Standards, which to a great extent 
reflects the convergence of the International Financial Reporting Standards. Before that 
the accounting standards between China and the US has a great deal of difference. We 
think that is the main reason why there are few data available on the website before 2006. 
We focus the analysis on period from 2006 to 2012. In China specifically, a large 
percentage of corporate equity is state owned which means government is the controlling 
shareholders. The operational and financial goals of state-owned firms maybe very 
different from those of privately owned firms, e.g. state owned firms may not be 
maximizing profits. State owned firms are great influenced by fiscal and monetary 
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policies to satisfy the overall economic objectives of the government. Thus some 
variables may have different effect on cash holding when compared to the result for 
developed countries such as the U.S, i.e. that Chinese firms are conservative and exercise 
precaution in cash management. 
This study investigates the determinants of Chinese firm’s cash holdings for the 
period from 2006 to 2012. We collect data from firms’ financial statements and 
ownership from the database ORBIS
1
. We require that firms have positive cash ratio in 
the given time period. We exclude financial industry as they hold cash for capital 
requirements instead of economic reasons. We also remove service industry from the 
observations because their financial factors are not what we are looking for. We only 
focus on manufacturing industry; and we generate a table, which contains 8 financial 
factors of 1406 companies and 6462 observations. In addition, to minimize the influence 
of extreme outliers, we follow the literature review and key variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles. 
In this study, we also use firm size as a control variable and we further control for 
industry and year effect. Small firms are not as diversified as large firms, in terms of 
markets and products. This tends to suggest more risk for small firms in comparison with 
large firms under the normal times, let alone during the financial crisis. Moreover, it is 
well recognized that high tech and service companies tend to have fewer tangible assets 
that can be used as collateral. Their demand for cash is therefore higher than the other 
industries (Duchin et al. 2010). 
                                                     
1
 ORBIS is a global database containing detailed information on global companies. 
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3.2 Methodology 
  Primarily, we focus on the regressions using cash to asset ratio as dependent 
variable. Then we re-estimate the regressions using the logarithm of cash to asset ratio as 
dependent variable. This controls for possible non-linearities in the relationship between 
cash holdings and the independent variable. The independent variables we used to 
explain the relationship between determinants and cash holdings are as follows: 
1. Tobin’s Q ratio: we selected Tobin’s Q as the independent variable in order to 
investigate investor detection of earnings manipulation. Tobin’s Q is a measure of 
investment opportunities. We expect cash holdings, as well as cash flow sensitivities, 
to increase with Tobin’s Q. 
2. Firm size. There are economies of scale to holding cash. We take log of the total asset 
to measure size of firms. 
3. Cash flow to assets. We measure cash flow as earnings after interest, cash dividends 
and tax. We take cash or cash equivalent divided by value of total asset. 
4. Net working capital. Net working capital is the assets that substitute for cash. We 
assume net working capital has a negative relationship with cash holdings. 
5. Capital expense to assets. Capital expenditure is measured by the ratio of capital 
expense to book value of asset. CAPEX is positively related to cash holdings. 
According to Riddick and Whited (2009) research, productivity shock will cause 
increase in investment and temporarily less cash savings. 
6. Leverage. Leverage is the long-term debt plus debt dividend by book assets. Most 
companies use leverage to invest or operate. However, it comes with more risk. Thus 
for firms with constrained debt, there is a negative relationship between leverage and 
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cash holdings. 
7. Industry sigma. Industry sigma, which is industry cash flow, is the mean of deviations 
of cash flow over assets in the 10 years. Companies with higher industry cash flow 
risk tend to hold more cash for precautionary motives.                                         
8. R&D: research and development as a parameter to measure the growth opportunities 
of firms. In general, R&D activities consume cash. In order to run R&D, firms need 
to hold sufficient money. Thus R&D is positively related to cash holdings. 
  Based on the variables listing above, we run two regressions to testify the determinants 
on cash holdings: 
(1) 
(2)
 
Where  
 is Tobin’s Q ratio to measure stock valuation 
 is parameter to measure size of the firms 
 is cash flow to asset ratio 
 is parameter of net working capital 
 is CAPEX 
 is leverage 
 is industry sigma 
 is research and development expense 
  
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8
* * * * * * * *
Cash Holding
X X X X X X X X
Total Assets
                  
 
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8
log( ) * * * * * * * *
Cash Holding
X X X X X X X X
Total Assets
                  
 
 
1X
2X
3X
4X
5X
6X
7X
8X
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4. Summary statistics 
We list the definition of key variables in Table 1 and the statistics of key variables 
in Table 2 and Table 3. 
Table1. Definition of key variables 
Variable Usage Description 
CASH RATIO   Cash 
Cash and cash equivalent divided by 
Total asset 
TOBIN'S Q  Long-term growth 
Enterprise value divided by Total 
asset 
FIRM SIZE  Size Log of Total asset 
CASH FLOW  Cash flow Cash flow divided by Total asset 
NWC  Liquid asset substitutes 
Net working capital divided by Total 
asset 
CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURE  
Investment 
Additions to fixed asset divided 
by Total asset 
LEVERAGE  Leverage ratio 
Total liability and debt divided by 
Total asset 
INDUSTRY SIGMA  Volatility of cash flow 
Volatility of an industry's cash flow 
divided by a 10-year period 
R&D  Research and development 
Research and development expense 
divided by Total asset 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our sample. The sample consists of 6462 
firm-year observations from 1406 non-financial firms listed on Chinese domestic 
exchange from 2003 to 2012. The descriptive statistics include: cash ratio, log of cash 
ratio, Tobin’s Q, firm size, cash flow ratio, net working capital ratio, capital expenditure 
ratio, and leverage ratio, research and development expense ratio. Result included are the 
mean, median, standard deviation, the minimum, the maximum and the 25
th
, 50
th 
and 75
th
 
percentiles. Because firms vary in size, to normalize data, we use total asset to divide 
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each independent variables. Our main variable in the analysis, cash holdings has a mean 
of 0.32 and a median of 0.18 with a standard deviation of 46%. Because of the skewness 
of the variable, we use the log of cash holdings. 
Table2. Statistics of key variables 
 
Table 3 briefly describes correlations among each variable. There is no 
remarkable relationship between the independent variables. But NWC has a significant 
inverse relationship with cash ratio/log cash ratio. The table presents Tobin’s Q has a 
negative correlation with cash ratio/log cash ratio. This result does not obey the studies in 
the literature. To study the time influence to these variables, we made a correlation for 
each year (Appendix A). The trends of correlations are very similar for large sample. We 
will discuss these relations in detail in the following parts. 
 
Variables
Mean Median Std Min Max P25 P50 P75
N
6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462
CASH 
RATIO 
0.320 0.184 0.464 0.000 7.213 0.057 0.097 0.149
LOG CASH 
RATIO 
-0.745 -0.735 0.488 -4.239 0.858 -1.348 -1.107 -0.939
TOBIN'S Q  
1.312 0.864 7.315 -0.500 578.119 0.229 0.449 0.680
FIRM SIZE 
5.614 5.533 0.595 2.285 8.538 4.960 5.167 5.345
CASH FLOW 
0.177 0.059 9.472 -20.012 761.231 -0.032 0.008 0.030
NWC 
-0.019 -0.009 0.252 -6.059 0.906 -0.317 -0.193 -0.112
CAPEX 
-0.061 -0.045 0.057 -0.611 0.000 -0.141 -0.102 -0.079
LEVERAGE  
0.568 0.519 1.684 0.018 123.982 0.212 0.324 0.416
R&D
-8.41E-04 0.00E+00 7.27E-03 -2.03E-01 2.82E-03 -3.37E-03 -1.68E-03 -1.12E-03
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  Table3. Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
 
 
CASH 
RATIO 
LOG CASH 
RATIO 
TOBIN'S 
Q  
FIRM 
SIZE 
CASH 
FLOW NWC CAPEX LEVERAGE 
INDUSTRY 
SIGMA R&D 
CASH 
RATIO 1.000
LOG CASH 
RATIO 0.700 1.000
TOBIN'S Q  -0.024 -0.034 1.000
FIRM SIZE -0.131 -0.041 -0.129 1.000
CASH FLOW -0.002 0.004 0.981 -0.068 1.000
NWC -0.591 -0.568 0.002 0.026 -0.001 1.000
CAPEX 0.059 -0.018 0.020 -0.117 0.004 0.118 1.000
LEVERAGE -0.074 -0.087 0.909 -0.070 0.906 -0.096 0.042 1.000
INDUSTRY 
SIGMA -0.061 -0.102 0.008 -0.101 -0.006 0.066 0.028 -0.013 1.000
R&D -0.129 -0.082 0.016 -0.021 0.001 0.096 -0.022 0.005 0.060 1.000
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5. Results and interpretation 
In Table 4 we illustrate mean and median cash and leverage ratio in order to see 
the relationship between cash holdings and debt. The second column of table reports the 
number of sample firms for each year. We measure the cash ratio as cash and cash 
equivalents divided by total assets. The third column summarizes the aggregate cash ratio 
for each year is the sum of the cash holdings of all the firms divided by the total assets of 
all the firms. The next two columns reproduce the average and median cash ratio for each 
year. For the reason that 2003-2005 there are too few observations, we only take the 
observations from 2006 to 2012 for our estimation. From 2006 and 2012, the aggregate 
cash ratio reached the peak at 2010 of 15.22% as the average cash ratio and median cash 
ratio. For the next step, we intend to turn to the application of the trend of cash ratio 
changing to leverage. So the sixth column shows the average leverage ratio which is the 
totally liabilities divided by total asset for each firm of each year. We run a regression on 
the average cash ratio and average leverage ratio for each year (Appendix B). The 
coefficient is -0.26081 and has a p-value less than 0.05. However, the regression is only 
useful for the same period.  
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Table4. Average and median cash and leverage ratios for 2003-2012 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the average cash ratios for the firm size from 2006 to 2012. 
The sample includes the observations from 2006 to 2012 with positive values of assets 
and no missing data for cash and cash equivalents in China. The cash ratio is measured as 
the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to the book value of total assets. Firms are sorted 
into quintiles based on the enterprise value. We define that firms with cash ratio below 
the median ratio are small firms, and firms with cash ratio above median are large firms. 
Then we use the mean of small and large firms for each year to represent the cash holding 
trends. The average cash ratio increases and decreases for both large firms and small 
firms during the same period, though the increase or decrease is more pronounced for 
large firms. The increase in the average cash ratio for the large firms is especially strong 
during 2006-2010 that covers financial crisis period, but decreased dramatically since 
2010. We find this phenomenon is similar to the performance of US firms; Chinese firms 
tend to increase their cash holdings during financial crisis as compared to the normal 
times. Generally, firms that are more financially constrained, and with more investment 
opportunities, are more likely to have greater cash holdings. During financial crisis, firm 
are facing more risks and thus holding more cash for precautionary motives. Since 2010, 
the economic situation begins to look up, the cash holdings begin to decrease. 
Year N
Aggregate cash 
ratio
Average cash 
ratio
Median cash 
ratio
Average 
leverage
Median 
leverage
2003 7 0.2304 0.2841 0.2058 0.7286 0.6370
2004 9 0.1133 0.1778 0.0620 0.8988 0.7409
2005 18 0.1296 0.1421 0.0687 1.3479 0.7752
2006 456 0.1377 0.1968 0.1349 0.5964 0.5763
2007 689 0.1333 0.2215 0.1504 0.7730 0.5579
2008 787 0.1305 0.2288 0.1527 0.6070 0.5521
2009 847 0.1460 0.3079 0.1780 0.6038 0.5432
2010 1029 0.1522 0.4272 0.2141 0.5427 0.5013
2011 1245 0.1457 0.3889 0.2093 0.4979 0.4569
2012 1376 0.1341 0.3286 0.2019 0.4831 0.4717
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Figure1. Mean cash-to-assets, 2006-2012 
 
Our study examines the relation between cash holdings and various controls for 
firm specific variables in a multivariate setting using regressions. Table 5 reports the 
results of our model, as a test for cash holdings. The dependent variable in all the 
regressions is the cash/assets ratio and natural log of cash/assets, which is calculated as 
cash divided by assets less cash holdings, and the independent variables are firm specific 
factors affecting cash holdings. The regression coefficients of different variables address 
the predictions of our hypotheses relating to cash ratios. 
We test the hypotheses of cash holdings in China by the following models. First, 
we run OLS regression. Next, we run the OSL regression with the dependent variable of 
log of cash/assets. The third regression is year dummy regression by adding a dummy 
variable for each year in the period 2006-2012 into the OLS model.  
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ca
sh
 r
a
ti
o
 
Cash Ratio Comparison 
Large firms
Small firms
 - 19 - 
 
Table5. Regression results of cash holdings from 2006-2012 
 
The results demonstrate that as Tobin’s Q increase, cash holdings increase in 
model one but decrease in the other two models. Following the literature review, we use 
Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities. We expect cash holdings and cash 
flows sensitivities to have a positive correlation with Tobin’s Q. So we are worried about 
that may be market-to-book ratio is not a good proxy for investment opportunities for 
Chinese firms. When we calculate Tobin’s Q, we captures both the value of investment 
opportunities together with the probabilities that the firm will take the investment 
opportunities, but the probability may vary for different countries, especially for Chinese 
firms which most of the significant industries are state-owned or the major shareholder is 
government. So whether the enterprise will go into an investment or not is mostly 
decided by the national government considering of their interests and the economical 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
INTERCET 0 0 1.0795
t-stat 0 0 0
TOBIN 0.0068 -0.0481 -0.0279
t-stat -0.0256 0 0
FIRM SIZE 0.083 -0.0916 -0.1151
t-stat 0 0 0
CASH FLOW 0.0291 0.0734 0.0529
t-stat 0 0 0
NWC -1.2594 -1.2508 -1.2112
t-stat 0 0 0
 EXPENDITURE 1.2648 0.8023 1.2997
t-stat 0 0 0
LEVERAGE -0.2114 -0.2313 -0.2009
t-stat 0 0 0
INDSIGMA 0.0003 -0.0536 -0.0207
t-stat -0.9593 0 0.0009
R&D -3.7335 -0.158 -3.5386
t-stat 0 0.7972 0
N 6463 6463 6463
ADJUSTED R^2 0.6241 0.6241 0.5076
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policies. Moreover, the market-to-book ratio is also affected by differences in the 
measurement of book assets. In China, we use CAS Plus as the principle of accounting, 
which is quite different from the US firms, we think this may also cause the Tobin’s Q 
ineffective. The third factor we believe is the political interference and earnings 
manipulating in Chinese firms. Firms with greater state holdings and close relationship 
with the government are able to obtain bank loans more easily than firms with lower state 
holdings, due to state influence on the banks making the loans. Firms with higher state 
ownership have greater financial resources than firms with lower state ownership and less 
need to rely on rights issues to obtain capital.   
In the first model, we don’t use dummy variables for years. Capital expenditure 
and industry sigma have positive coefficients. The significance on of the coefficients on 
NWC, leverage and research and development expense is all negative. In both model one 
and model two, capital expenditure has positive and significant coefficients.  
We next investigate whether the intercepts of the models change over time, 
identifying an increase in the cash ratio not explained by changes in modeled firm 
characteristics. We add year as one indicator dummy variable to the model allowing for 
intercept shifts in changes in firm characteristics.  
The coefficients of these variables are consistent with the static trade of theory. 
Finally, the static trade of theory does not make clear predictions about the coefficient of 
leverage, but the result for this coefficient is consistent with the financing hierarchy 
model. To the extent that the evidence supports the static trade of model, it cannot be the 
case that cash holdings are a matter of indifference. 
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6. Conclusion 
How to manage cash is important for corporations in China. Firms need to seek an 
optimal strategy with respect to cash management. In this study, we examine the 
determinants of corporate holdings of cash. We first found out that Chinese firms have 
the similar trend to US firms. Chinese firms tend to increase their cash holdings during 
financial crisis than the normal times. When firms are more financially constrained, they 
are more likely to hold more cash. Furthermore, firms with lower leverage, less net 
working capital (NWC), and lower capital expenditures, are more likely to increase cash 
holdings as well. But investment opportunity is not the only factor that has an influence 
on cash holdings. When it comes to investment opportunity, we have to take the 
economic policy of the country’s government into consideration. 
 At the same time, however, it is also quite clear that variables that make debt 
costly for a firm are variables that make cash advantageous. Because the determinants of 
cash are so closely related to the determinants of debt in our analysis, it is important in 
future work to figure out, both theoretically and empirically, to what extent cash holdings 
and debt are two faces of the same coin. 
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Appendix A 
Table of statistic of key variable 
 
Because the calculation for cash ratio is cash and cash equivalent divided by the 
difference between total asset and cash and cash equivalent. This will be one possible 
reason that having a large number of cash ratio. 
Variables
Mean Median Std Min Max P25 P50 P75
N
6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462 6462
CASH 
RATIO 
0.320 0.184 0.464 0.000 7.213 0.057 0.097 0.149
LOG CASH 
RATIO 
-0.745 -0.735 0.488 -4.239 0.858 -1.348 -1.107 -0.939
TOBIN'S Q  
1.312 0.864 7.315 -0.500 578.119 0.229 0.449 0.680
FIRM SIZE 
5.614 5.533 0.595 2.285 8.538 4.960 5.167 5.345
CASH FLOW 
0.177 0.059 9.472 -20.012 761.231 -0.032 0.008 0.030
NWC 
-0.019 -0.009 0.252 -6.059 0.906 -0.317 -0.193 -0.112
CAPEX 
-0.061 -0.045 0.057 -0.611 0.000 -0.141 -0.102 -0.079
LEVERAGE  
0.568 0.519 1.684 0.018 123.982 0.212 0.324 0.416
R&D
-8.41E-04 0.00E+00 7.27E-03 -2.03E-01 2.82E-03 -3.37E-03 -1.68E-03 -1.12E-03
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Appendix B 
Table of correlation for each year from 2006-2012 
 
 
Because Tobin’s Q represents the investment opportunities, the financial market 
in China was well performing in 2006, this create the opportunities for firms. Thus, the 
positive correlation appears in the table for 2006. 
 
 
As mentioned in above, the correlation for large sample size years have similar 
trends. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
TOBIN'S Q  -0.7892 -0.5516 -0.3683 0.0227 -0.0085 -0.1763 -0.1116 -0.0747 -0.2323 -0.1656
FIRM SIZE 0.3636 0.0026 0.0243 -0.0236 -0.0075 -0.0195 -0.1116 -0.1641 -0.2497 -0.2544
CASH FLOW 0.4843 0.4490 0.2458 0.1727 -0.0015 0.0353 0.0376 0.0448 0.0756 0.1592
NWC -0.8750 -0.6889 -0.5318 -0.5960 -0.5633 -0.3953 -0.4669 -0.6675 -0.6943 -0.6770
CAPEX 0.1097 -0.9324 0.0428 0.0608 0.0267 0.0402 0.1205 0.0936 0.0604 0.0555
LEVERAGE -0.1880 -0.2448 -0.2500 -0.1611 -0.0188 -0.1137 -0.1050 -0.1792 -0.2519 -0.2870
INDUSTRY 
SIGMA 
-0.0023 0.2991 -0.0179 -0.0820 -0.0866 -0.0634 -0.0534 -0.0707 -0.0461 -0.0405
R&D V8 -0.7851 -0.0296 -0.1229 -0.6408 -0.4596 -0.4062 -0.1356 -0.0289 -0.0314 -0.0405
CASH RATIO Y
-1.2000
-1.0000
-0.8000
-0.6000
-0.4000
-0.2000
0.0000
0.2000
0.4000
0.6000
TOBIN'S Q FIRM SIZE CASH FLOW NWC CAPEX LEVERAGE INDUSTRY
SIGMA
R&D V8
Correlation 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Appendix C 
Regression result of Cash ratio and leverage ratio 
 
 
It implies: Cash ratio = 0.45501 – 0.26081* Leverage ratio. 
 
 
Coefficients
Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value
Lower 
95%
Upper 
95%
Lower 
95.0%
Upper 
95.0%
Intercept 0.45501 0.06543 6.95389 0.00012 0.30412 0.60590 0.30412 0.60590
X Variable -0.26081 0.08730 -2.98745 0.01740 -0.46212 -0.05949 -0.46212 -0.05949
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